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By testing nonlocality, the security of entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) can be enhanced
to being ’device-independent’. Here we ask whether such a strong form of security could also be established
for one-way (prepare and measure) QKD. While fully device-independent security is impossible, we show that
security can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi-device-independent scenario. In the latter, the
devices used by the trusted parties are non-characterized, but the dimensionality of the quantum systems used
in the protocol is assumed to be bounded. Our security proof relies on the analogies between one-way QKD,
dimension witnesses and random-access codes.
PACS numbers:
The aim of quantum cryptography [1] is to warrant security
against an eavesdropper solely limited by the laws of quantum
mechanics. However, any quantum key distribution (QKD)
scheme relies on an additional assumption which concerns in-
formation leakage out of the laboratories of Alice and Bob.
Specifically, both parties must be free to choose which mea-
surement they perform in each run of the protocol, and this
choice of measurement, as well as the outcome of this mea-
surement, should remain unknown to the eavesdropper. In-
deed if the eavesdropper has access to the lab of Alice or Bob,
then security cannot be guaranteed.
Apart from these basic requirements, standard security
proofs of QKD [2] also assume that Alice and Bob have an ex-
cellent control on the quantum states and measurements used
in the protocol. This assumption is however hard to justify in
practice, where devices always feature some level of imper-
fection. Moreover this assumption turns out to be crucial, as
nicely illustrated in Ref. [3]. There it was shown that the se-
curity of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol [4] is entirely
compromised if Alice and Bob use 4-dimensional states in-
stead of qubits—as usual security proofs always assume. It
is however possible to avoid this requirement by basing the
security on nonlocality. Specifically, by checking for the vi-
olation of a Bell inequality [5], Alice and Bob can ensure
that they share nonlocal correlations, in which case security
can be guaranteed without having any detailed knowledge on
the functioning of the cryptographical devices [6, 7]. This is
’device-independent’ (DI) QKD [8] (see also [9]).
The promise of a higher level of security, as well as the
recently demonstrated attacks on actual QKD systems [10],
have motivated research towards the practical implementation
of DI-QKD. Despite recent progress [11], this remains a chal-
lenging problem. Moreover, the fact that DI-QKD is based
on nonlocality strongly suggests that only entanglement based
protocols are suitable for obtaining this stronger notion of se-
curity. However, almost none of the practical QKD systems,
in particular none of the commercially available ones, use en-
tanglement; they all operate in a one-way configuration, in
which Alice prepares a quantum state, sends it to Bob who
then performs a measurement on it (hence often called ’pre-
pare and measure’).
Here we will argue that a form of DI security—thus
stronger than usual security proofs—can nevertheless be ob-
tained for QKD protocols which do not make use of en-
tanglement. Specifically, we shall see that in a semi-
device-independent scenario, in which the devices are non-
characterized but only assumed to produce quantum systems
of a given dimension, security of one-way QKD against in-
dividual attacks can be demonstrated. In particular our proof
will make use of the analogy between one-way QKD proto-
cols, dimension witnesses [12] and random-access codes [13].
To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first
QKD security proof that can be applied directly to the one-
way configuration.
We shall start by presenting the semi-DI scenario we con-
sider, stating clearly all assumptions we make. Then, we will
consider the BB84 protocol and show that it becomes com-
pletely insecure in this context. This will also make clear
that dimension witnesses are suitable tools for tackling this
problem. Next we will discuss the intimate relation existing
between dimension witnesses and random-access codes [14].
Finally we will describe a specific QKD protocol and derive,
via its associated dimension witness (or random-access code),
a security proof.
I. PRELIMINARIES
In a one-way QKD scheme Alice encodes classical infor-
mation in a quantum system, which she sends to Bob via a
quantum channel. Bob then performs a measurement on the
system, from which he decodes some information. After re-
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FIG. 1: Semi-device-independent one-way QKD.
2peating these operations many times, Alice and Bob estimate
the error rate (by revealing randomly chosen bits from the raw
key) which leads to an upper bound on Eve’s information. Fi-
nally Alice and Bob perform classical post-processing—error-
correction, privacy amplification—to extract the sifted key on
which Eve has arbitrarily small information.
Here we shall work in a semi-DI scenario. That is, we
will assume that the (relevant) Hilbert space dimension of the
quantum systems is known [21], but that the quantum prepara-
tions and measurements are non-characterized. It will thus be
convenient to describe the devices of Alice and Bob by black
boxes. Specifically Alice’s black box is a ’state preparator’.
Alice has the freedom to choose among a certain set of prepa-
rations ρa ∈ Cd with a ∈ {0, .., N − 1}, but knows nothing
about these quantum states apart from their dimensionality d.
We also assume that Alice’s preparations ρa are unentangled
from Eve—note that if Alice’s preparations were entangled
with Eve’s system, then the communication capacity would
be effectively doubled using dense coding. Bob’s device is
a measurement black-box. He can choose to perform a mea-
surement My with y ∈ {0, ...,m − 1} and gets the outcome
b ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}. The measurement operators My are non-
characterized; note that Eve could in principle send a system
of arbitrary dimension to Bob. The boxes may also feature
shared classical variables λ, known to Eve, but uncorrelated
from the choice of preparation made by Alice and the choice
of measurement made by Bob.
After repeating this procedure many times, Alice and Bob
can estimate the probability distribution (or data table [15])
P (b|a, y) = tr(ρaM by), (1)
which denotes the probability of Bob finding outcome b when
he performed measurement My, and Alice prepared ρa. Our
goal will be to show that, in some cases, the security of a
given protocol against a quantum eavesdropper can be guar-
anteed solely from its associated data table P (b|a, y). The
security is thus semi-DI, in the sense that we do not require
any knowledge on how the data table P (b|a, y) was obtained,
except from the fact that the device of Alice emits quantum
systems of a given dimension.
Here we will restrict ourselves to individual attacks, in
which Eve attacks independently each system sent by Alice
(using the same strategy) and measures her system before the
classical post-processing [1]. Indeed we also need to make the
basic assumption about information leakage from the devices.
That is, no information about the inputs and output (i.e. a, y
and b) leaks out of the boxes to Eve.
II. DIMENSION WITNESSES
At this point one can already see a first requirement for ob-
taining semi-DI security for a given protocol. Suppose Al-
ice’s device prepares d-dimensional quantum systems. Then it
must be impossible to reproduce the quantum data table with
classical systems of dimension d. If not, then it could have
been the case that Alice’s device emits orthogonal quantum
states (or equivalently classical states) from which Eve can
get full information. Thus, full DI security, that is where no
assumption is made on the Hilbert space dimension, is impos-
sible, since every data table can be reproduced using classical
systems of sufficient dimension.
It turns out that a simple method for establishing lower
bounds on the dimension of classical systems necessary to
reproduce a given data table was recently developed in Ref.
[12]. More precisely, they authors devised ’dimension wit-
nesses’, of the form∑
a,y,b
wabyP (b|a, y) ≤ Cd, (2)
which can be thought of as Bell-type inequalities for data
tables. Here the bound Cd denotes the maximal value of
the left-hand-side polynomial obtainable when Alice’s de-
vice prepares classical d-dimensional systems. Interestingly,
d-dimensional classical dimension witnesses can be violated
by d-dimensional quantum systems, thus indicating that cer-
tain quantum data tables cannot be reproduced using classical
states of the same dimension. Below we will make use of this
’quantum advantage’. We will consider a simple dimension
witness which provides a separation between qubits and bits.
In particular we will show how this witness can be naturally
understood as a random-access code, which will allow us to
prove semi-DI security of the corresponding QKD protocol.
From now we will now focus on the case where Alice’s de-
vice prepares 2-dimensional quantum systems, and restrict to
four preparations (N = 4) indexed by two bits a0, a1. Bob’s
device can perform two binary measurements (m = 2, k = 2).
For the rest of the paper it will be convenient to use expecta-
tion values of the form
Ea0a1,y = P (b = 0|a0a1, y). (3)
Thus every experiment corresponds to a data table, given by a
vector ~E = {Ea0a1,y}a0a1,y of Nm = 8 correlators.
First, we would like to characterize the set of data tables
(i.e. the set of vectors ~E) which can be obtained when Alice’s
box emits classical bits. We follow the geometrical methods
of Ref. [12]. The set of interest to us is a polytope (in an 8-
dimensional space). Its facets are (tight) 2-dimensional clas-
sical witnesses; that is inequalities of the form (2) with d = 2
(note that here probabilities are simply replaced by correla-
tors). It turns out that there are only two types of witnesses in
the case. The first is a straightforward extension [22] of the
witness I3 of Ref. [12]. The second is of the following form:
S = +E00,0 + E00,1 + E01,0 − E01,1
−E10,0 + E10,1 − E11,0 − E11,1 ≤ 2 (4)
This witness will be our main tool to assess the security of
one-way QKD protocols.
BB84 is not secure. As a warm-up, it is instructive to con-
sider first the case of the BB84 protocol. In this case, the four
preparations of Alice are given by
ρ00 = |0〉 〈0| , ρ11 = |1〉 〈1|
ρ10 = |+〉 〈+| , ρ01 = |−〉 〈−| . (5)
3Here |0〉 and |1〉 are the eigenstates of the Pauli matrix σz ,
and |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2 are the eigenstates of σx. The two
measurements of Bob are given by M0 = σz and M1 = σx.
Thus the corresponding data table is given by E00,0 =
tr(ρ00σz) = 1, and similarly E10,1 = 1, E01,1 = E11,0 = 0,
and E00,1 = E01,0 = E10,0 = E11,1 = 1/2. Thus the BB84
data table achieves S = 2 and thus does not violate the wit-
ness (4)—note that it also satisfies the witness I3 of [12] as
well as all symmetries—which indicates that it can be repro-
duced by sending one classical bit when the boxes of Alice
and Bob share randomness. Note that this a peculiarity of the
BB84 data table [23]. Indeed this result also applies to any
protocol using the same states and measurements as BB84,
for instance the SARG protocol [16].
A possible strategy is the following. Alice and Bob share
one random bit λ. Considering Alice’s preparations, note that
the bit a0 ⊕ a1 denotes the basis, while the bit a1 denotes
the encoded bit. When λ = 0, Alice sends to Bob the (one
bit) message m = a0. Bob, upon getting his input y and
the message from Alice m, outputs b = m ⊕ y = a0 ⊕ y.
Thus b = a1 whenever Alice and Bob choose the same basis
(a0 ⊕ a1 = y), and b 6= a1 when they choose a different basis
(a0⊕a1 6= y). When λ = 1, Alice sends the messagem = a1,
and Bob outputs b = m = a1. Thus we have that a1 = b for
any pair of basis a0 ⊕ a1, y. Since the shared variable λ is
unbiased, Alice and Bob reproduce the BB84 data table.
III. CONNECTION TO RANDOM-ACCESS CODES
To devise a secure QKD protocol in the semi-DI setup, we
need to consider data tables which violate (at least) one of the
dimension witness I3 or S. Here we shall focus on the latter,
which it will be useful to think of in terms of a random-access
code.
Specifically, let us imagine that Alice receives two (uni-
formly distributed) bits a0 and a1. She is then allowed to send
a physical system to Bob, which encodes information about
her input bit string. Bob is asked to guess the y-th bit of Al-
ice (y is uniformly distributed as well), and thus performs a
measurement on the system he received from Alice to extract
this information. This is a 2-to-1 random-access code. When
Alice sends one bit of classical communication, the optimal
average probability for Bob to succeed is 3/4 [13].
The witness S (4) represents a 2-to-1 random-access code.
For each of her four possible input bit strings {a0, a1}, Alice
associates a preparation ρa0a1 . Upon being asked to guess
bit y, Bob performs measurement My. The outcome of the
measurement b is then his guess for ay .
From inspection of S, we see that wa0a1,y = (−1)ay
(where wa0a1,y is the coefficient of the term Ea0a1,y), which
implies that
S =
∑
a0,a1,y
P (b = ay|a0a1, y)− 4 (6)
Thus, for a given data table, Bob’s success probability
PB =
1
8
∑
a0,a1,y
P (b = ay|a0a1, y) = S + 4
8
(7)
is determined by the value of the dimension witness S, and
inversely. Indeed the inequality PB ≤ 3/4 corresponds to
S ≤ 2. Note that the relation between dimension witnesses
and random-access codes can be generalized (see also [14]
for a related approach).
It turns out that Alice and Bob can perform better at this
task when using qubits. The optimal set of preparations
are, for instance, obtained by having preparations (5), but
changing Bob’s measurements to M0 = (σz + σx)/
√
2 and
M1 = (σz − σx)/
√
2. This choice of preparations and mea-
surements leads to S = 8 cos2 (π/8)− 4 or equivalently
PB = cos
2 (π/8) ≈ 0.8536. (8)
Note that this set of preparations and measurements is inti-
mately related to the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt Bell in-
equality (see also [14]).
IV. SECURITY OF ONE-WAY QKD
The protocol is based on the preparations and measure-
ments achieving the optimal violation of S for qubits. Alice
generates two random bits a0, a1 and sends the correspond-
ing preparations ρa0a1 to Bob. Bob generates a random bit y
and performs measurement My and guesses bit ay . After re-
peating these operations a large number of times (we consider
here only the asymptotic limit), Alice and Bob can estimate
the data table by revealing part of their data on a public chan-
nel. By computing the value of S they obtain PB . Below we
show that if PB > 5+
√
3
8
≈ 0.8415—a value slightly lower
than the optimal value using qubits (8)—security is obtained.
Proof. Csiszar and Ko¨rner [18] showed that Alice and Bob
can obtain a secret key if I(A : B) > I(A : E), where the
mutual information is given by
I(A : X) =
∑
j
1− h(PX(ayj )). (9)
Here yj denotes the choice of basis (or equivalently which bit
of Alice partyX chose to guess) in the j-th run of the protocol,
and h(p) is the Shannon binary entropy. From this, one can
get a sufficient condition for security given by
PB > PE (10)
where PX = 12 (PX(a0)+PX(a1)) denotes the average prob-
ability of guessing correctly for party X .
Our main ingredient will be a result derived by Ko¨nig [17].
Consider the set Fn of all (boolean) balanced functions on
n-bit strings—that is which return 0 for exactly half of the
2n strings. Alice gets as input the n-bit string and Bob is
asked to guess the value of a randomly (and uniformly) chosen
function in Fn after receiving from Alice s qubits. Then the
4average probability for Bob to succeed is upper bounded as
follows
Pn ≤ 1
2
(
1 +
√
2s − 1
2n − 1
)
. (11)
For the case of interest to us, i.e. n = 2 bits, the set of all
balanced functions is a0, a1, a0 ⊕ a1, and their negations.
Clearly the optimal probability of guessing a function or its
negation are equal. Thus, when Alice sends a single qubit to
Bob (s = 1), we have that
PB(a0) + PB(a1) + PB(a0 ⊕ a1) ≤ 3
2
(
1 +
1√
3
)
. (12)
Clearly the previous inequality holds also when Bob and
Eve collaborate—the index B is then simply replaced by
BE—and we will make use of it in this case. Using the rela-
tions PBE(ai) ≥ PB(ai) and PBE(ai) ≥ PE(ai) and
PBE(a0 ⊕ a1) ≥ PBE(a0, a1)
≥ PBE(a0) + PBE(a1)− 1, (13)
where the second inequality follows from the sum rule, we get
PBE(a0) + PBE(a1) + PBE(a0 ⊕ a1)
≥ 2PB(a0) + 2PE(a1)− 1. (14)
Using (12) we get that
PB(a0) + PE(a1) ≤ 5 +
√
3
4
(15)
and an analogous inequality with a0 and a1 interchanged.
This shows that when Eve tries to guess a different bit than
Bob (i.e. she measures in the wrong basis) she will necessar-
ily disturb the statistics of Bob. From inequality (15) and its
symmetry with respect to a0 and a1, we get that
PB + PE ≤ 5 +
√
3
4
. (16)
This implies that PB > PE as long as
PB >
5 +
√
3
8
≈ 0.8415 (17)
as announced. For the optimal qubit preparations and mea-
surements achieving (8), the key rate is found to be
r = I(A : B)− I(A : E) ≈ 0.0581. (18)
V. DISCUSSION
We have discussed the security of one-way QKD in a semi-
device-independent context. By making links to dimension
witnesses and random-access codes, we showed that security
against individual attacks is possible.
It is natural to ask whether this concept is relevant from
a practical viewpoint. Since semi-DI QKD represents a re-
laxation of the assumption of standard QKD proofs, it offers
several advantages, notably that no assumptions on the de-
vices are required (apart from the fact that Alice’s device emits
preparations of bounded dimension), and that it can be applied
directly to the one-way configuration. At this stage, our result
should however be understood as a proof-of-principle. A next
step would be to study robustness to imperfections (such as
losses or detection efficiency) as well as against more gen-
eral attacks. It would also be interesting to improve on our
bound for security (which is likely to be suboptimal), and to
see whether all data tables violating a classical dimension wit-
ness could offer security. In this context it might also be rele-
vant to consider entropic quantities [14, 19].
A comparison to full DI QKD is also worth. Arguably the
main drawback of our approach is the assumption of bounded
dimensionality, as it forces us to assume that Alice’s device
features no side-channels from which Eve could extract in-
formation. This requirement could however be partly lifted
by finding protocols where qubits offer security under the as-
sumption that the preparations are arbitrary quantum states of
higher dimensions—note that this would require protocols us-
ing more preparations.
Finally, from a more foundational point of view, it would
be interesting to study the connection between semi-DI one-
way QKD and DI entanglement-based QKD, in the light of the
strong link that exists between nonlocality and random-access
codes [20].
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